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Résumé : La plupart des projets d’architectures cognitives dans les sciences
cognitives et des explications des processus cérébraux dans les neurosciences
interprètent l’esprit/cerveau comme réactif : le processus est déclenché par
un stimulus et se termine par une réponse. Mais il y a de plus en plus de
données laissant penser que le cerveau est endogéniquement actif : des oscil-
lations de l’activité électrochimique à de multiples fréquences ont lieu dans
le cerveau même en l’absence de stimuli et ceux-ci servent plutôt à moduler
ces oscillations qu’à déclencher l’activité. De plus, des données montrent que
cette activité endogène est utilisée dans diverses activités de traitement de
l’information. Je m’appuie sur les données issues des enregistrements cellu-
laires unitaires, de l’EEG et de l’IRMf en situation passive, afin de soutenir
la thèse d’un comportement oscillatoire continu dans le cerveau et d’identifier
plusieurs manières dont ce comportement peut contribuer à la cognition. Si les
sciences cognitives ont pour but de comprendre comment nous effectuons des
tâches cognitives, elles ont besoin de développer des architectures cognitives
qui intègrent le type d’activité endogène dynamique présentée par le cerveau.
Abstract: Most proposals of cognitive architectures in cognitive science and
accounts of brain processes in neuroscience construe the mind/brain as reac-
tive: processing is initiated by a stimulus and terminates in a response to it.
But there is growing evidence that brains are endogenously active: oscillations
in electrochemical activity at multiple frequencies are ongoing in the brain even
in the absence of stimuli and stimuli serve to modulate these oscillations rather
than initiate activity. Moreover, evidence is growing that this endogenous ac-
tivity is used in various information processing activities. I appeal to evidence
from single-cell recording, EEG, and resting state fMRI to support the claim
of ongoing oscillatory behavior in the brain and identify several ways it may
contribute to cognition. If cognitive science is to understand how we perform
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cognitive tasks it needs to develop cognitive architectures that incorporate the
sort of endogenous dynamic activity exhibited by the brain.
1 The search for cognitive architectures
The cognitive tradition is distinguished from its behaviorist predecessor by fo-
cusing on information processing mechanisms that are thought to exist within
the mind-brain and hypothesized to explain behavior. Cognitive researchers
have often assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, that the brain takes in
information through the senses, represents it, performs operations on the rep-
resentations, and responds by either changing its internal state or planning
and executing actions. In the early decades of cognitive science it was difficult
to identify the neural processes that served as representations for high-level
cognitive processes such as memory, reasoning, and problem solving and the
neural operations through which they were processed. As a result, most cog-
nitive theories of information processing had to rely on indirect measures such
as reaction times and error patterns to guide and evaluate hypotheses as to
the representations employed and the operations performed on them. For ex-
ample, Sternberg used the time required for subjects to determine whether a
test item was on a list of items they had memorized to determine that humans
perform exhaustive serial search [Sternberg 1966].
One way cognitive scientists, especially those focused on computational
modeling of cognition, further constrained their inquiry was to develop pro-
posals as to the nature of the cognitive architecture. A cognitive architec-
ture specifies the primitive operations the mind/brain is thought to perform.
Proposed architectures such as Newell’s SOAR [Laird, Newell & Rosenbloom
1987] and Anderson’s ACT-R [Anderson 1990, 2007] were defended on the-
oretical grounds that they possessed the appropriate primitive capacities for
performing the cognitive activities performed by humans. For those skeptical
of the proposal that the mind performs operations on symbol structures, the
parallel distributed processing framework or connectionism provided an alter-
native class of architectures [Rumelhart & McClelland 1986], emphasizing in
particular feedforward networks trained by backpropagation. (For an overview
and taxonomy of cognitive architectures, see [Duch, Oentaryo & Pasquier
2008].) Researchers working with a particular architecture constrain them-
selves to account for various aspects of human cognitive activity using the
primitive operations provided in the architecture. None of these architectures
was originally developed primarily with an eye to characterizing the represen-
tations and processes used in the brain (although connectionists sometimes
refer to their approach as brain-style computing), but as techniques have been
developed to relate cognitive processing to neural activity, advocates of some
cognitive architectures have tried to show that their architecture fits with our
understanding of how the brain functions.
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These cognitive architectures typically adopt a reactive perspective on the
mind/brain. Cognitive activity is assumed to begin with the presentation of
a task or stimulus, which is represented and the representation is then trans-
formed via operations specified by the architecture. This reactive conception
of cognition (it occurs in response to a stimulus) has also been shared as
the neurosciences began to provide insight into the representations and op-
erations performed. The first successes in identifying neural processes that
represent information resulted from investigations of sensory and motor pro-
cessing in which it was possible to link brain activity (typically spiking rates
of neurons) with sensory stimuli or motor activities. With respect to visual
processing, for example, researchers beginning with Kuffler [Kuffler 1953] and
Hubel and Wiesel [Hubel & Wiesel 1962, 1968] employed such techniques as
single- and multi-cell recording to determine what features of visual stimuli
were correlated with specific neuronal activity. The activity of these neurons
was then viewed as representing the correlated features of the visual stimulus,
and researchers hypothesized operations through which these representations
were successively transformed in a hierarchy of processing areas ([van Essen &
Gallant 1994]; for an analysis of this history, see [Bechtel 2008]). In the 1970s
researchers developed techniques for relating the electrical signal recorded at
the cortical surface (electroencephalography or EEG) to stimulus presentation
(measuring what are known as Evoked Response Potentials or ERPs). While
ERP studies provided little information about the spatial locus of activity,
they offered information about the temporal order of processing. For example,
Kutas and Hillyard found that when the last word of a sentence was anoma-
lous the EEG exhibited a negative deflection peaking about 400 milliseconds
later (hence, an N400 response) [Kutas & Hillyard 1980]. The introduction
of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) in the late 1980s and functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) in the 1990s allowed researchers to be-
gin to locate cognitive operations in brain regions in humans. Petersen, Fox,
Posner, Mintun,& Raichle, for example, adapted the subtractive method, de-
veloped by Donders in the mid-19th century for identifying the time required
for a cognitive operation, to identify the brain regions responsible for such
operations [Petersen, Fox, Posner et al. 1988]. Thus, in their pioneering PET
study they subtracted the blood flow measured when subjects simply read a
noun aloud from that measured when they first generated a related verb and
read it aloud. They found increased activity in the left prefrontal cortex (also
the cerebellum and the anterior cingulate), which they argued to be the locus
of the semantic processing required for the task.
Researchers adopting the reactive perspective have provided a great deal
of information about information processing in the brain, especially in areas of
sensory and motor processing and increasingly with respect to memory, atten-
tion, and emotional responses. But there are reasons to be skeptical about the
adequacy of the reactive perspective. Since the pioneering studies of Lorente
de Nó [Lorente de Nó 1938], researchers have recognized that there are at least
as many, and likely many more, backwards and collateral projections than for-
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ward ones.1 The reactive perspective, however, has been able to provide little
insight into what contribution to information processing these operations per-
form since whatever contribution they make has already affected how brain
areas respond to stimuli and typically cannot be separately identified. (One
exception has been the investigation of how attention modifies processing of
perceptual stimuli. See [Corbetta & Shulman 2002].)
Although it has received far less attention, there is an alternative tradition
in brain research that has emphasized the endogenous activity of the brain,
viewing stimuli as perturbing on-going brain activity, not initiating activity.
This tradition traces back at least to Thomas Graham Brown, who studied
neural mechanisms for motor behavior in decerebrate cats in the Liverpool
laboratory of Charles Scott Sherrington, a chief proponent of adopting a re-
active perspective on the brain [Brown 1911, 1914]. Both were interested in
motor activity such as walking which appear to originate from inside the or-
ganism. Sherrington extended the reactive framework to explain such behavior
in terms of a sequential reflex mechanism, by which peripheral input (e.g., to
the cat’s feet when placed on a moving treadmill) produced a sequence of neu-
ral signals (to the spine, within the spine, and out to flexor and then extensor
muscles) [Sherrington 1923]. Each cycle of stepping resulted in renewed input
(sensory feedback) and hence ongoing, rhythmic stepping movements. Brown
discovered that he could obtain similar rhythmic stepping even after isolat-
ing the spinal cord from afferent (peripheral) input by cutting the dorsal root
nerves. He accounted for its rhythmic outputs by proposing a coupled network
of spinal neurons—one for flexion and one for extension—that each inhibited
the other’s behavior to generate oscillations. Brown’s proposals anticipated
research on what came to be known as the central pattern generator [Wilson
& Wyman 1965]. More recently, Brown’s perspective on endogenous activity
has been advanced by researchers using the very tools employed by the reactive
tradition—single-cell recording, EGG, and fMRI.
In this paper I will argue that the evidence for the endogenously active
perspective on the mind-brain is extremely compelling and that in light of it
cognitive researchers should fundamentally reconceive their conceptions of cog-
nition and cognitive architectures to incorporate and recognize the significance
of endogenous activity. I begin by considering what it means to claim that
a biological mechanism exhibits endogenous activity and focus on how indi-
vidual neurons are endogenously active, then explore how EEG and fMRI are
revealing synchronous activity of populations of neurons and inspiring propos-
als as to how they figure in neural processing. I then conclude by emphasizing
how this body of research points to the need for fundamental revisions in the
cognitive architectures employed in cognitive science.
1. For the most part in this paper I will focus on connections, forward, recurrent,
and collateral within the cerebral cortex and hippocampal formation. But these
present only a portion of the story. Most sensory information reaches cortex via
regions in the thalamus, and there are almost ten times as many recurrent projections
from cortex back to these thalamic regions as there are forward projection.
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2 Endogenously active mechanisms in the
brain
Claiming that the brain is endogenously active may strike some as compa-
rable to proposing that it is a perpetual motion machine. That is, however,
far from what is being proposed. All living organisms, and accordingly those
with a nervous system and a brain, are open in the thermodynamic sense
to matter and energy from their environment. What is distinctive about
biological organisms is that they are organized systems—hence not in equi-
librium with their environment—and that they maintain themselves in this
non-equilibrium state despite the tendency exhibited by closed systems to-
wards equilibrium (high entropy). The equilibrium tendencies are manifest
in the continual degradation of organic structures that require living systems
regularly to repair themselves [Rosen 1991] or else cease to exist as organized
systems. Moreover, they must perform the operations needed to construct
themselves—incorporate matter into the organized structure with which they
are identified. Maturana and Varela [Maturana & Varela 1980] have referred
to this as autopoiesis and viewed it as the foundation of cognition (see [Lyon
2006], for a systematic discussion). Crucial to autopoiesis, but not empha-
sized by Maturana and Varela, is that organisms must capture and employ
free energy from their environments in autopoiesis and repair. Ruiz-Mirazo
and Moreno have made this a central feature in their characterization of living
organisms as autonomous [Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno 2004] and Barandiaran and
Moreno have extended the view to cognition [Barandiaran & Moreno 2006].
Organisms must initiate these activities of autopoiesis and repair from
within, and this entails that they be endogenously active, not reactive. As
Gánti emphasized in his proposal of the chemoton as the minimal chemical
system capable of exhibiting the characteristics of life, cyclic processes that
can regularly return to the same condition are fundamental to autonomous
systems—as a result of cyclic organization, an organism can regularly re-
store itself to the conditions where it can perform the operations necessary
to build and repair itself [Gánti 2003]. As long as the organization of the
cyclically organized system is adequate to recruit free energy from the en-
vironment, it can continue to iterate the stages in the cycle. If one tracks
variables representing states of the system through time, they will oscillate. If
there are time delays within the cyclic system, and especially if the operations
within the cycle are non-linear, these oscillations can be sustained indefinitely
provided sufficient matter and energy are available. Goodwin pioneered the
analysis of sustained oscillations in biological systems [Goodwin 1963], show-
ing in a computational model how a feedback loop inspired by Jacob and
Monod’s operon model for gene regulation in bacteria [Jacob & Monod 1961]
could, with appropriate parameters, generate a sustained oscillatory system.
Subsequently, other theorists such as Goldbeter have pursued the approach
and have drawn attention to a substantial number of endogenous oscillations
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in biological systems [Goldbeter 1996]. (For further discussion see [Bechtel &
Abrahamsen 2011].)
While mechanisms that are endogenously active clearly occur in nature
and are fundamental to living systems, many of the accounts of mechanism
and mechanistic explanation advanced by the new mechanistic philosophers
of science are inadequate to characterize them. Following what has been the
dominant emphasis in mechanistic research in biology over the past several cen-
turies, these accounts emphasize the parts and operations of mechanisms and
the processes by which researchers decompose mechanisms into their parts and
operations ([Bechtel & Richardson 1993-2010]; [Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005];
[Glennan 1996, 2002]; [Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000]; [Thagard 2003];
[Wimsatt 2007]). These accounts of mechanism also note the importance of
how components are organized but, like many scientists, they tend to privi-
lege sequential organization. Thus, Machamer, Darden, & Craver include in
their definition of a mechanism that they are “productive of regular changes
from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” [Machamer, Darden &
Craver 2000, 3]. Sequential organization, however, cannot produce endogenous
activity—this requires negative feedback or other cyclic designs. Moreover,
not all negative feedback systems sustain oscillations; only ones with non-
linear components and appropriate parameter values can do so. Determining
whether a particular mechanism will generate continued activity (e.g., oscilla-
tion) or settle into a stable state requires employing the tools of computational
modeling and dynamical systems analysis. Bechtel and Abrahamsen ([Bechtel
& Abrahamsen 2010]; see also [Bechtel 2011]) designate explanations that in-
voke computational modeling to understand patterns of change over time in
the properties of the parts and operations of a mechanism as dynamic mech-
anistic explanations.
Sustained oscillators are the simplest endogenously active mechanisms—as
long as they can recruit free energy from their environment they are continually
active. Neurons are examples of such sustained oscillators. The endogenous
nature of neuronal activity, however, is often not appreciated. Since early in
the 20th century, when techniques were developed for recording the electrical
activity of individual neurons, neuroscientists have often treated the genera-
tion of action potentials as the principal activity of neurons. The common
picture, both in textbooks and in philosophical discussions, is that neurons
reside at their resting potential until they receive sufficient inputs on their
dendrites to raise the voltage above threshold, after which they generate an
action potential on their axon and, over time, return to their resting potential.
On this view, neurons are reactive components. Although most accounts of
neural processing focus on action potentials, they represent only a small part
of the electrical activity in the brain. Even before individual action poten-
tials could be recorded, researchers such as du Bois-Reymond had recorded
electrical potentials from muscle cells and neurons [Du Bois-Reymond 1848-
1884]. Bernstein had identified a greater concentration of potassium (K+) ions
inside than outside the cell, and proposed that the electrical current result-
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ing from diffusion out of the cell explained the negative potential of the cell
at rest [Bernstein 1912]. He further proposed that, when excited, other ions
would diffuse across the membrane, eliminating the diffusion potential of the
K+ ions. Hodgkin and Huxley determined that in addition to the potassium
gradient, there is a sodium (N+) gradient (with N+ concentrations greater
outside the cell during the resting potential phase) and that the conductance
of each ion varies independently and depends on the voltage across the mem-
brane [Hodgkin & Huxley 1952]. Except when the relative concentration of a
given ion on each side of the membrane (its membrane potential) equals its
reversal or equilibrium potential, ions will flow either into or out of the cell.
Hodgkin and Huxley’s interest in these currents was principally to ex-
plain the action potential, which most researchers continued to view from a
reactive perspective. But some researchers, working as Hodgkin and Huxley
had with invertebrate neurons, found specialized pacemaker neurons that gen-
erated their own rhythmic action potentials [Alving 1968]. Others began to
focus on the variety of voltage-gated and other currents that could be observed
across neuronal membranes and explored the complex patterns of change in
these currents not only in axons but also in the dendrites and cell bodies of
neurons (reviewed by [Kandel 1976]).
Initially mammalian researchers, who followed in the tradition of
Sherrington and treated neurons as integrating inputs and firing when these
inputs pushed them above their threshold, viewed these studies skeptically.
This began to change in the 1970s and 1980s when Llinás and his collabo-
rators found a variety of functionally important ion currents in neurons of
the inferior olive and cerebellum in mammals and birds. Most were spatially
distributed and gated by voltage in a different manner than the sodium and
potassium channels in the axon, equipping them for functions other than the
direct generation of action potentials. Notably, the dendrites were endowed
with channels providing high-threshold conductance to calcium (Ca2+) ions,
enabling dynamically complex dendritic excitation in contrast to earlier as-
sumptions of passive transmission of signals from synapses.2 Moreover, the
cell bodies of some neurons in the inferior olive had a different kind of cal-
cium channel with a seemingly paradoxical low-threshold conductance that,
in interaction with sodium and high-threshold calcium conductances, enabled
these neurons to function as single-cell oscillators “capable of self-sustained
rhythmic firing independent of synaptic input” [Llinás 1988, 1659].3 They
sent these rhythmic action potentials to target neurons in the cerebellum that
were able to respond at the same frequency, qualifying them as resonators in
2. This linked nerve excitability with the Ca2+-dependent second messenger sys-
tem that is important for regulating general cellular functions.
3. For further exposition, see [Buzsáki 2006, 181–183], who comments: “These
findings [...] illustrate that nature went to a lot of trouble bringing together these
channels at the right densities and location just to serve one purpose: oscillation.”
For evidence extending the findings to sensory neurons in various mammalian species,
see [Huguenard 1996].
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the dynamical lexicon championed by Llinás—reacting, but in ways shaped by
their internal properties. Llinás also investigated spontaneous oscillations in
electrical potentials elsewhere in the brain.
Llinás’ findings revealed that the neurons are oscillators—some of which
maintain oscillations on their own while others resonate to oscillations initiated
by others. This has consequences not just for how we conceive of neurons but
how we understand their interactions. As Huygens had observed in his 1665
letters to de Sluse (letters no 1333 of 24 February 1665, no 1335 of 26 February
1665, no 1345 of 6 March 1665 published in [Huygens 1888]), as long as there
is a means to convey a signal (even a very weak one) between two pendulum
clocks (a pendulum clock is an oscillator) with nearly the same periods, they
tend to synchronize their oscillations and exhibit a common phase relation.
When signals can be passed between multiple oscillators, some with differ-
ent natural frequencies, complex patterns of activity can develop. A given
component may synchronize with some but oscillate out of phase with other
components.
Emphasizing the oscillatory dynamics across neural membranes is not in
conflict with focusing on them as generating action potentials in response
to stimuli. Inputs reduce the electrical potential of the neuron and action
potentials arise when they cross a threshold. If the electrical potential of
neurons is oscillating, there will be periods when they are less polarized and
hence closer to threshold and other periods when they are more polarized.
An input that may suffice to push neurons across the threshold when they
are hypopolarized may be insufficient to do so when they are hyperpolarized.
Moreover, when two neurons are linked in a circuit and their oscillations are
synchronized, the periods when the first neuron is most likely to generate
an action potential will correspond to periods when the second is likely to
generate an action potential in response. On the other hand, when they are
desynchronized, the second neuron will be less likely to generate an action
potential at the time when the first neuron is most likely to. I turn now to
considering how such dynamical behavior of neurons is manifest in populations
of neurons engaged in cognitive tasks.
3 Oscillations detected with EEG and LFP
A variety of techniques have been developed that can detect synchronized
electrical potentials of populations of neurons. One of the first involved elec-
trodes, initially inserted into the scalp and subsequently placed on the scalp.
In his pioneering research in which he coined the name Elektrenkephalogramm
(electroencephalogram or EEG in English) for the technique, Berger reported
that he could record electrical oscillations from lead foil electrodes affixed to
the heads of human beings [Berger 1929, 1930]. In particular, he detected
large-amplitude oscillations of approximately 10 Hz when subjects were awake
with their eyes closed that he called alpha rhythms and smaller amplitude,
The Endogenously Active Brain 11
Figure 1: In this eight-second extract of a recording made by Berger [Berger 1930],
the upper line is a subcutaneous EEG. It shows three seconds of predominantly alpha
waves that were blocked 0.27 seconds after he stroked the subject’s hand with a glass
rod (indicated by arrow B on the 10 Hz timing signal at the bottom). For at least
the next two seconds the EEG shows lower-amplitude, higher-frequency beta waves,
not alpha waves. The middle line is an electrocardiogram recorded simultaneously.
Extracted from Figure 5 in Gloor’s translation [Gloor 1969, 82] of [Berger 1930].
faster oscillations (20-30 Hz) that became apparent once alpha rhythms de-
clined when subjects opened their eyes, received input from another sense, or
performed an attention demanding task (see Figure 1).
Berger and others initially assumed that the EEG was generated from ac-
tion potentials. Eventually researchers recognized that they resulted not from
action potentials but from synchronized post-synaptic potentials in dendrites
discussed in the previous section [Bremer 1958]. Moreover, research such as
that of Jahnsen and Llinás on the thalamus and thalamocortical relay neurons
helped link dynamic behavior of individual neurons to the large-scale dynamics
seen in EEG [Jahnsen & Llinás 1984].
In the decades after Berger’s pioneering work, researchers identified both
faster oscillations (greater than 30 Hz) that they designated gamma rhythms
as well as a variety of slower oscillations (delta, 0-4 Hz, and theta, 4-8 Hz,
rhythms). Typically oscillations at different frequencies are all combined in the
electrical activity researchers record and techniques such as fast Fourier anal-
ysis are required to differentiate components in the overall signal. Moreover,
researchers have also found that the same activity can be detected from elec-
trodes implanted into brain tissue as long as the electrodes are not too close
to any given neuron. When detected in this way the currents are referred to
as local field potentials.
The most common application of the various rhythms detected with EEG
has been to differentiate overall cognitive states—states of active awareness
(gamma), quiet resting (alpha), and various stages of sleep (delta, theta). For
many years little progress was made in linking EEG oscillations to more specif-
ically characterized cognitive functions. Instead, the primary use of EEG in
cognitive research has been in ERP studies that reflect the reactive conception
of neural processing. The difference in the overall electrical activity produced
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due to the stimulus is quite small in relation to the electrical activity that orig-
inates either endogenously or in response to other stimuli, so ERP researchers
must average over many trials in order to extract a signal. Ironically, they
are thereby removing from consideration the endogenous background activity
that Berger had first identified.
In recent decades, however, some researchers have begun to identify cor-
relates of cognitive activity directly in the EEG signal itself. One of the first
hypotheses resulted from the detection of gamma oscillations in visual process-
ing areas in anesthetized cats presented with moving bars with a particular
orientation [Gray, Konig, Engel et al. 1989]. Singer and his colleagues de-
veloped an interpretative framework in which gamma oscillations served to
temporarily bind together the neural representations of different features of a
particular object which are represented in the action potentials of neurons in
different visual processing regions (Singer characterized this as the binding-
by-synchronizaton hypothesis [Singer 1999]). Subsequent researchers have de-
tected gamma oscillations in awake, alert cats, monkeys, humans, and other
species, in response to the presentation of shapes and smoothly transforming
shapes (reviewed by [Fries 2009]). Gamma oscillations have also been found
in somatosensory and auditory processing areas. Recent studies have shown
that gamma synchronization requires not just inputs but top-down activation
due to attention.
These gamma oscillations appear to be the result of initial inputs to pyra-
midal cells that then elicit responses in basket cells that distribute an inhibitory
signal that blocks further action potentials in the pyramidal cells on which they
synapse until their effects wear off in a synchronized manner, allowing synchro-
nized spiking behavior. The population of basket cells are then entrained to
maintain a regular oscillation which leaves windows in which action potentials
can be generated in the pyramidal cells [Hasenstaub, Shu, Haider et al. 2005].
The effect of synchronized action potentials allows the outputs of many cells
to be received by a downstream neuron in a common temporal window so that
they sum sufficiently to produce an action potential in it.
Binding-by-synchronization retains a reactive conception of brain process-
ing since it represents the features elicited by a stimulus as coming to be
bound. But other investigations of gamma oscillation suggest that they may
reflect an endogenous component of brain processing. Whittington, Traub, &
Jefferys found that pharmacologically-isolated inhibitory neurons, when pro-
vided with a tonic excitatory drive (activation of metabotropic glutamate re-
ceptors), generate gamma oscillations without specific inputs [Whittington,
Traub & Jefferys 1995]. Researchers soon found other conditions that would
generate gamma oscillations and Wang and Buzsáki pioneered the project of
constructing computational models to examine conditions under which net-
works of inhibitory interneurons would generate gamma oscillations [Wang &
Buzsáki 1996]. However, their model required conditions not found in the
experimental preparations. Kawaguchi, Katsumaru, Kosaka, Heizmann, &
Hama’s discovery of fast-spiking inhibitory neurons that express the calcium
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binding protein parvalbumin provided a clue as to how these oscillations arise
[Kawaguchi, Katsumaru, Kosaka et al. 1987]. Parvalbumin expressing neurons
form networks of mutually connected neurons in which gamma oscillations are
created and then transmitted to pyramidal cells via their output connections
to these cells [Bartos, Vida & Jonas 2007]. The parvalbumin-expressing cells
are highly active during gamma oscillations during which they generate action
potentials once per cycle in a phase-locked manner [Gloveli 2005], supporting
the hypothesis that they play a fundamental role in generating gamma oscilla-
tions. Moreover, they affect the pyramidal cells in a distinctive way—they do
not cause them to hyperpolarize, but use chloride channels to shunt electrical
activity. The result is a mechanism that is robust against the heterogeneity of
the tonic drive—with high excitation an early conductance-dominated phase
causes subsequent action potentials to occur later whereas with low excitation
the depolarization-dominated phase causes subsequent action potentials to be
advanced. The result is to create regular, clock-like epochs in which action
potentials can arise; information processing is thus structured into discrete
temporal windows.
Fries proposes that these gamma oscillations may be located within slower
theta oscillations in such a fashion that theta oscillations provide larger tem-
poral windows in which gamma synchrony may develop but is then interrupted
so as to process new input [Fries 2009]. As evidence for this proposal he cites
Rollenhagen and Olson’s recordings from individual inferotemporal neurons
after first presenting a preferred stimulus and then 600 ms later adding a non-
preferred to the preferred stimulus [Rollenhagen & Olson 2005]. Presentation
of the second stimulus resulted in a reduction in firing rate, followed by an
approximately 5 Hz (theta range) oscillation between periods of enhanced
and reduced firing, suggesting a theta frequency oscillation between the re-
sponse to the preferred and non-preferred stimulus. Since such oscillation is
also observed in recording from individual neurons when only the preferred
stimulus is presented, Fries proposed the theta oscillations are an endoge-
nous process that allows a period for developing a response to a stimulus
followed by a period that opens the processing system up to seeking new in-
put rather than simply continuing to respond to the first stimulus. It thus
insures that any response to a stimulus is only metastable and that processing
does not stop with it.
Both gamma and theta oscillations are also exhibited in the hippocampus
where researchers have advanced hypotheses as to their contribution to cog-
nitive processing of spatial information. The hippocampus is organized into a
loop structure (Figure 2)—it receives input from the entorhinal cortex (EC)
that is transmitted along a pathway to the dentate gyrus, the CA3 fields, the
CA1 fields, and subiculum before sending inputs back to the entorhinal cortex.
There is also a pathway directly from the EC to the CA1 fields.
Following reports that rats with hippocampal lesions exhibit deficits in the
sorts of navigation tasks that had led Tolman to propose that they possess a
cognitive map of their environment [Tolman 1948], O’Keefe began detailed
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Figure 2: The loop architecture of the hippocampus in which input from entorhinal
cortex is either processed in the dentate gyrus and CA3 before reaching CA1 or is
directly received by CA1.
functional analysis of the response characteristics of hippocampal neurons.
Recording from individual cells in the CA1 and CA4 regions (CA4 is a small
region not commonly discussed) of the hippocampus, O’Keefe and Dostrovsky
identified a number of cells that generated several bursts of action poten-
tials whenever a rat was in a particular location in its enclosure [O’Keefe &
Dostrovsky 1971]. O’Keefe later termed these place cells and argued that
they constituted the rat’s cognitive map of its environment [O’Keefe & Nadel
1978]. During the same period Ranck identified cells that generated bursts of
action potentials in the theta range when the rat was moving [Ranck 1973].
Over the following decade research focused primarily on place cells, especially
on conditions involving changes in the enclosure that would cause different
cells to produce bursts of spikes despite the rat being in the same location.
O’Keefe and Recce initiated a new phase of research when they explored the
relation between place cell activity and theta oscillations and determined that
the bursts of action potentials from place cells exhibited a somewhat higher
frequency than the ongoing theta oscillation [O’Keefe & Recce 1993]. As shown
in Figure 3, the initial burst would typically occur during the peak of the theta
oscillations and subsequent bursts would precess earlier in the theta oscilla-
tions so that by the time the rat left the place field (the region that elicited
activity from a particular cell), the bursts would have advanced nearly a full
cycle. Considering only the activity of a single place cell, the amount of pre-
cession specifies how long the rat has been in the place field and thus how far
it has advanced through it. From a population perspective, however, the infor-
mation is even richer. Among cells whose place fields partially overlap, those
place cells whose action potentials have precessed the most represent places
the rat entered earlier while the ones in which action potentials have precessed
the least represent those the rat has just entered. Thus, the activity across
the population of place cells in relation to theta specifies the rat’s trajectory.
In addition to theta activity, the hippocampus also exhibits gamma oscilla-
tions at two different frequencies, one originating in medial EC, which exhibits
fast gamma oscillations (> 60 Hz), and the other in the CA3 region, which
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Figure 3: Illustration of theta precession. As rat runs along the maze, it crosses the
place field of a cell. The place cell spikes, shown in red, precess against the underlying
theta oscillation, firing first just after the peak and moving progressively early on
subsequent theta cycles. Reprinted by permission from The American Physiological
Society: Physiological Reviews, Wang, X.-J., 90, ©2010, Figure 1A, [Wang 2010].
generates slow gamma oscillations (< 60 Hz). As shown in Figure 2, these
represent the two regions from which CA1 receives input. I noted above that
neurons are most likely to fire when they are synchronized with those from
which they receive input. From these considerations and the fact that CA1 at
different times exhibits fast and slow gamma oscillations, Colgin, Denninger,
Fyhn, Hafting, Bonnevie, Jensen, Moser, & Moser have hypothesized that
these different gamma oscillations regulate the processing of information—at
different times the CA1 fields synchronize with the fast gamma of the en-
torhinal cortex and respond to input from it and at other times synchronize
with the slow gamma of CA3 and hence respond to inputs from it [Colgin,
Denninger, Fyhn et al. 2009]. The processing in DG and CA3 is thought to
facilitate recognizing a location as a previously experienced one; when that
fails, CA1 responds directly to the assumed to be novel place represented by
the EC activity. An important process in the hippocampus is long-term po-
tentiation (LTP), which strengthens synaptic connections on which an input
is received when the recipient neuron actually generates an action potential.
LTP occurs only when a neuron generates a spike during the through of the
theta cycle, which happens when CA1 is synchronized with entorhinal cortex.
This limits learning a new representation to occasions when the DG-CA3 loop
fails to recognize the location, a situation in which it is appropriate to acquire
a new representation. When an old location is recognized, CA1 synchronizes
with CA3 and spikes occur at the peak of the theta cycle when LTP is blocked.
After a period during which the only way researchers were able to relate
EEG activity to cognition was through ERP, which adopted a reactive perspec-
tive, researchers are beginning to formulate hypotheses as to how oscillations,
especially those in the theta and gamma bands, that arise independently of
specific stimuli figure in information processing. These oscillations have been
proposed to create time windows in which neural processes may develop re-
sponses to inputs but then break out of the response to sample other inputs
as well as ways of gating the flow of information between brain regions and
controlling processes such as LTP. These proposals suggest that the brain is
a dynamically active processing system in which the ongoing dynamics struc-
tures and regulates processing in time.
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4 Oscillations detected with PET and fMRI
One of the limitations of EEG for studying cognitive processing in the brain is
that while it provides high-resolution information about the timing of electri-
cal activity, it is very difficult to localize spatially the source of the electrical
signal. Thus although a small cadre of researchers employed EEG and ERP
to investigate cognitive processing in the brain in the 1970s and 1980s, their
investigations failed to spark the development of cognitive neuroscience as a
prominent field of inquiry. Rather, this happened only after the development
of techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET) in the late 1980s
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in the 1990s. These tools
used tomographic methods to localize the source of either a radioactive or
magnetic signal that was assumed to be related to specific cognitive activi-
ties. As described above, in the initial research with PET and fMRI studies
researchers sought to identify regions in which blood flow was correlated with
cognitive activities. Thus like ERP researchers, PET and fMRI researchers
initially viewed the cognitive system as a reactive mechanism and focused on
detecting increased activity that could be attributed to the task a subject was
performing. Accordingly, they paid little attention to the varying background
signal except insofar as it posed challenges in detecting the signal attributed
to the stimulus or task.
In the mid-1990s some researchers (e.g., [Ghatan, Hsieh, Wirsén-Meurling
et al. 1995]; [Baker, Rogers, Owen et al. 1996]) drew attention to the fact
that some brain regions seemed regularly to exhibit reduced activity (were
deactivated) in task conditions than in a resting state (a condition in which
the subject lay quietly in the scanner with no assigned task). To determine
how widespread this effect was, Shulman, Corbetta, Buckner, Fiez, Miezin,
Raichle, & Petersen conducted a meta-analysis of PET studies in which a task
condition was compared to a non-task condition in which the same stimulus
was presented (this produced results very similar to the resting condition with
no stimulus) [Shulman, Corbetta, Buckner et al. 1997]. They identified a
specific set of brain areas that were reliably less active in task situations:
the junction of precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), the inferior
parietal cortex (IPC), the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (left DLPFC),
a medial frontal strip that continued through the inferior anterior cingulate
cortex (inferior ACC), the left inferior frontal cortex, the left inferior frontal
gyrus, and the amygdala.
Shortly thereafter Raichle and his collaborators shifted their perspective
from viewing these areas as deactivated in task conditions to viewing them
as being more active in non-task conditions and began to characterize them
as constituting a default mode network—one which performs actual functions
best carried out when there are no external task demands. One clue as to their
function was provided by Andreasen, O’Leary, Cizadlo, Arndt, Rezai, Watkins,
Ponto, & Hichwa who found that episodic memory tasks were one type of task
that did not result in reduced activity in these regions [Andreasen, O’Leary,
The Endogenously Active Brain 17
Cizadlo et al. 1995]. Some researchers drew upon this finding to suggest that
the default mode network supports undirected thinking or what had been
labeled mind-wandering. This coheres with the reports by Andreasen et al.’s
subjects that, when required to lay in the scanner with no task requirements,
they thought about their own past or planned future activities. These are
both activities that draw upon episodic memory.
Adopting the mind-wandering hypothesis, Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and
Schacter link mind-wandering to the ability to carry out “flexible self-relevant
mental explorations—simulations—that provide a means to anticipate and
evaluate upcoming events before they happen” [Buckner, Andrews-Hanna &
Schacter 2008, 2]. In defending this view they cite not only Andreasen et al.’s
results but also correlations found by Mason et al. between stimulus indepen-
dent thoughts and activity in the default network [Mason, Norton, Van Horn
et al. 2007]. Gilbert, Dumontheil, Simons, Frith, & Burgess offer an alterna-
tive view that activity in the default network generates low-level generalized
awareness or watchfulness [Gilbert, Dumontheil, Simons et al. 2007]. This
alternative gains support from Hahn, Ross, & Stein’s findings of increased ac-
tivity in the default network in a target-detecting task when the target could
appear anywhere, but not when it was expected in a specific location [Hahn,
Ross & Stein 2007]. A potential problem for both of these treatments of the
function of the default mode network is that it has been found to be active not
just when individuals are awake but also during sleep ([Fukunaga, Horovitz,
van Gelderen et al. 2006]; [Larson-Prior, Zempel, Nolan et al. 2009]) and under
anesthesia ([Vincent, Patel, Fox et al. 2007])—circumstances in which neither
spontaneous conscious thoughts (such as Andreasen et al.’s subjects report)
nor generalized awareness and watchfulness occur. Even if activity in the
default mode network is found in the absence of conscious thought, the de-
fault mode network may nonetheless provide a neurophysiological foundation
for mind-wandering or watchfulness when the subject is engaged in conscious
thought. Mind-wandering and watchfulness are features of our mental life that
have been neglected by the reactive framework but as Buckner et al. suggest
may be important cognitive activities that enable us to anticipate and cope
with our environments.
The initial studies of the default mode network did not focus on the dynam-
ics of the activity in these areas, but a study by Biswal, Yetkin, Haughton,
& Hyde showed how fMRI could be used to identify dynamic processes in
task activated networks that were soon extended to the default mode network
[Biswal, Yetkin, Haughton et al. 1995]. These researchers performed a time
series analysis of fMRI recordings taken every 250 ms and observed very low-
frequency oscillations (< .1 Hz or one cycle every 10-15 seconds) as subjects
performed a simple motor task (moving their hand). Moreover, they found
that these oscillations synchronized across sensory and motor regions of the
brain in both hemispheres, which they interpreted as indicating functional con-
nections between these regions. Cordes, Haughton, Arfanakis, Wendt, Turski,
Moritz, Quigley, & Meyerand found similar oscillations in resting state BOLD
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signals in networks of areas previously identified as jointly exhibiting increased
activation in sensorimotor, visual, receptive language, or expressive language
tasks [Cordes, Haughton, Arfanakis et al. 2000]. Moreover, their functional
connectivity MRI (fcMRI) analysis—applying correlational statistics to resting
state BOLD time series data to determine patterns of synchronization—yielded
functional networks very similar to those identified from activity during tasks.
That is, areas within the same network had correlated patterns of activity
across time (rising and falling in synchrony) regardless of whether overall level
of activity was relatively high (e.g., the sensorimotor network while moving a
hand) or relatively low (e.g., the same network in a resting state condition).
To determine whether the default mode network also exhibited synchro-
nized activity, Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon employed fcMRI with two
seed areas identified with the default mode network, the PCC and inferior
ACC [Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss et al. 2003]. Using the PCC as the seed,
they found that its resting state oscillations were correlated with those in
much of medial prefrontal cortex (including inferior ACC and orbitofrontal
cortex), left DLPFC, IPC bilaterally, left inferolateral temporal cortex, and
left parahippocampal gyrus, virtually the same range of areas as Shulman
et al. had identified in their meta-analysis. They regarded their results as
providing “the most compelling evidence to date for the existence of a co-
hesive, tonically active, default mode network” [Shulman, Corbetta, Buckner
et al. 1997, 256]. When instead the ventral ACC was employed as the seed
area, they demonstrated correlated activity not just in the PCC but also in
the medial prefrontal cortex/orbitofrontal cortex, the nucleus accumbens, and
the hypothalamus/midbrain and they argued that these primarily paralimbic
and subcortical areas comprised a separate network important for calibrating
affective and autonomic operations. They argued further that the strong con-
nection between inferior ACC and PCC provided a crucial link between this
and the default mode network. Subsequently Greicius and Menon found that
the default network included the hippocampus [Greicius & Menon 2004] and
Vincent et al. determined that by seeding an analysis with a hippocampal
region they could find correlated activity in the rest of the default network
[Vincent, Snyder, Fox et al. 2006]. Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter
summed up the perspective provided by this research:
The default network is a brain system much like the motor system
or the visual system. It contains a set of interacting brain areas
that are tightly functionally connected and distinct from other
systems within the brain. [Buckner, Andrews-Hanna & Schacter
2008, 4–5]
The Cordes et al. results noted above showed that even in the resting state
one could demonstrate correlated activity across networks that would then be
jointly activated in task conditions. Fox et al. found correlated activity in
the resting state in a network that was especially active during attention-
demanding tasks (intraparietal sulcus, frontal eye field, middle temporal re-
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gion, supplementary motor areas, and the insula) and showed that activity
in that network and in the default network were anticorrelated [Fox, Snyder,
Vincent et al. 2005]. That is, the areas that were positively correlated within
each network were negatively correlated with areas in the other network—an
outcome more interesting than a zero correlation. Fox et al. emphasized that:
anticorrelations may be as important as correlations in brain orga-
nization. Little has been said previously in the neuronal synchrony
literature regarding the role of anticorrelations. While correla-
tions may serve an integrative role in combining neuronal activity
subserving similar goals or representations, anticorrelations may
serve a differentiating role segregating neuronal processes subserv-
ing opposite goals or competing representations. [Fox, Snyder,
Vincent et al. 2005, 9677]
The oscillations found using fMRI are one to two orders of magnitude slower
than those observed with EEG. Do they, like theta and gamma oscillations,
play a role in cognition? So far not a lot is known about their functional
significance, but a very intriguing finding by the Raichle group suggests that
it may have behavioral consequences. As I have noted, in reactive studies
researchers constantly confront the fact that there is great variability in the
recorded signal, which is often treated as noise. Fox, Snyder, Zacks, & Raichle
devised an innovative strategy for showing that a large part of this variability
may be the endogenous oscillation [Fox, Snyder, Zacks et al. 2006]. As subjects
performed a button-press task with their right hand whenever they identified
a new event in a video, a motor activity that is directed by the left side of
the brain, the researchers identified the ongoing oscillation in sensory-motor
areas on both sides of the brain. They found that the oscillations in the
right side of the brain accounted for much of the variation found in the fMRI
signal on the left side of the brain. Moreover, in a subsequent study the same
group found that the spontaneous fluctuation exhibited in the contralateral
hemisphere to that controlling the button push accounted for the force with
which a subject pressed the button [Fox, Snyder, Vincent et al. 2007]. This
finding is suggestive that endogenous activity may directly affected mental
processes and behavioral activities.
5 Dynamically organized networks in the
brain
The pattern of activity within correlated networks and between anticorrelated
networks, whether these networks are task characterized or the default mode
network, during conditions where subjects are not required to perform any
tasks reveals that there is highly organized endogenous activity in the brain.
During the same period as when fcMRI was revealing these functional net-
works, other techniques (e.g., diffusion tensor MRI) were being developed to
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analyze structural connectivity in the brain. The structurally and function-
ally characterized networks appear to be highly correlated. Greicius, Supekar,
Menon, & Dougherty showed that the regions in the default mode network
are anatomically connected [Greicius, Supekar, Menon et al. 2009]; van den
Heuvel, Mandl, Kahn, & Pol found that eight of the nine networks they identi-
fied in the resting state correspond to ones that can be characterized anatom-
ically as connected by fiber tracts [van den Heuvel, Mandl, Kahn et al. 2009].
Moreover, these networks have a similar type of structure. Whether ana-
lyzed structurally or functionally, they have been found to exhibit a small-
world structure [Watts & Strogratz 1998]. Small-world organization is a
form of organization that lies between regular lattices and randomly orga-
nized networks—as in lattices most connections are between nearby units but
a few connect between distant locations. For information processing purposes,
lattice structures have the virtue of creating modules of units that function
together to perform a particular task whereas random networks exhibit a short
path of communication across the network. Small-world networks possess both
properties and many real-world networks have been found to exhibit small
world organization, including the default mode network and task directed net-
works [Sporns 2010].
In thinking about cognitive architectures, it is common to construe them as
set down before cognitive activity and simply setting the possibilities for such
activity. But activity in the brain is now understood as capable of modifying
the structural organization of the brain. The brain is plastic and processes
such as LTP, discussed above, can change the connectivity of the brain. An
intriguing possibility that Raichle has advanced is that the synchronized slow
oscillations within networks may play a role in sculpting the brain. Gong and
van Leeuwen showed in a computational model that when changing connection
strengths between units occurred when units exhibit synchronized activity,
small-world organization would develop in the network [Gong & van Leeuwen
2004]. Even when these networks begin with random connectivity, they self-
organize into clusters linked to each other through hubs. Rubinov, Sporns,
van Leeuwen, & Breakspear appeal to Gong and van Leeuwen’s model to
suggest that as patterns of synchronized activity occur in the brain, the brain
might self-organize into a small-world network with hubs [Rubinov, Sporns,
van Leeuwen et al. 2009]. Some of the synchrony between neurons might be
the result of specific stimuli or tasks the brain is required to perform. But
if the synchronization between brain regions is ongoing, occurring during the
resting state as well as under tasks conditions, then some of the synchronized
activity that shapes the wiring of the brain will be a result of endogenous
functioning, not just stimulus induced activity.
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6 Developing an endogenously active
cognitive architecture
In the preceding sections I have presented evidence from a variety of sources
that brains not only respond to tasks or stimuli but also are endogenously
active and that this activity may be important for understanding cognition.
To begin with, neurons exhibit endogenous oscillations in the electrical activ-
ity on their membranes and they are more likely to generate action potentials
when they are in a hypopolarized phase than when they are hyperpolarized.
In addition, some neurons are capable of generating action potentials inde-
pendently of any input. Further, at the level of large populations of neurons
both EEG and fMRI reveal ongoing oscillatory activity that has traditionally
been treated as noise. EEG detects oscillations in a variety of frequency bands
above 1 Hz. Berger identified activity dominantly in the alpha band when
subjects are sitting quietly without stimulation, but even during this period
there are oscillations in other frequency ranges. Both theta and gamma oscil-
lations in cortex appear to be important in creating temporal windows with
gamma windows appearing to enable organized processing of inputs and theta
oscillations serving to periodically reset the processing system to respond to
alternative inputs. In the hippocampus different regions oscillate at different
frequencies, with some regions able to entrain to and then respond to the
oscillatory activity of different regions. Theta oscillations provide a timing
window in which the relative timing of action potentials carries information
and regulates whether activity such as LTP is to occur. The recent finding of
oscillations at less than .1 Hz with fMRI provide further perspective on the role
of endogenous activity in the brain, especially in revealing ongoing coordina-
tion of activity in multiple brain networks even during the resting state. There
is suggestive evidence that this activity is manifest in behavior and underlies
ongoing thought not tied to tasks (mind-wandering). The possible role of this
activity in sculpting the brain suggests that it is important in establishing the
processing capacities of the brain—i.e., the cognitive architecture.
The evidence of endogenous activity in the brain and suggestions that it
may be important for cognition poses a challenge to cognitive science that re-
lies on proposed cognitive architectures that are purely reactive. Moreover, it
raises the question of how cognitive researchers might develop accounts of the
cognitive architecture that incorporate endogenous activity. With individual
neurons, endogenous activity appears in the ongoing oscillations in the elec-
trical potentials over the membranes. One way of creating an endogenously
active system is to construct it out of oscillators. Populations of oscillators
have the potential to synchronize, but depending on the pattern of connections
between them, they may only form temporary coalitions of synchronized com-
ponents and so exhibit meta-stability. Accordingly, oscillators with processes
for synchronizing them constitute systems capable of the sorts of endogenous
activity found in the brain.
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Cognitive architectures are instantiated in computational models. It
is relatively easy to develop computational models that exhibit ongoing
oscillations—in fields of biology dealing with oscillatory phenomena, such as
circadian biology, researchers employ models of oscillatory components. Some
of these represent the components of the mechanism (involving in the circa-
dian case, the transcription and translation of genes) while others abstract
from these details and employ, for example, equations describing a van der Pol
oscillator [Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2010]. Populations are modeled by adding
terms to the basic equations for oscillators to characterize the transmission of
signals between them. In the context of neuroscience, computational modelers
have increasingly directed their attention to modeling membrane potentials
and using these model to understand the role of membrane potentials in gen-
erating population-level rhythms [Destexhe & Sejnowski 2003]. These models
provide resources for creating computational models of cognitive architectures
that exhibit endogenous dynamical activity. Developing and using such alter-
native cognitive architectures would provide cognitive researchers a basis for
investigating the possible contributions of endogenous activity to cognition.
On the other hand, by relying only on cognitive architectures that do not in-
corporate endogenous activity, cognitive scientists may lack the resources for
modeling cognition that occurs in brains that do make endogenous activity
available as a cognitive resource.
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